J.D. Trout is a Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University Chicago, and Adjunct Professor at the Parmly Sensory Sciences Institute. He received his PhD in Philosophy at Cornell University in 1988, and has also taught at Bryn Mawr College and Virginia Tech. His chief interests include the nature of scientific explanation, the psychology of human judgment, scientific realism and intellectual progress, and social/political issues bearing on well-being and the effective distribution of real opportunities. He has also published work in epistemology and experimental and theoretical work in spoken language processing. His research focuses heavily on the philosophical lessons that can be drawn from empirical results of developed sciences.
Realism, Naturalism, and Quantitative Methods of the Behavioral Sciences
Named a 1998 Outstanding Academic Book by Choice
"A radical book, and essential reading for courses in philosophy of science, statistics, and research methods."
-- Choice
"This is a brilliant and useful essay integrating theoretical philosophy and empirical psychology to the benefit of both disciplines. The essay is a paradigm example of how a philosophical perspective can bring order and new insights into scientific practice."
-- Reid Hastie, Professor of Behavioral Science, University of Chicago
In light of the growing philosophical interest in social science -- itself spawned by philosophical concerns regarding social theory and critique -- it will be necessary for informed philosophers to understand the methods of social research before subjecting the morals of that research to epistemic evaluation. In this course, we will provide the philosophical tools for this analysis, and no technical background will be presupposed.
Readings will be drawn from work by such figures as Jurgen Habermas (Knowledge and Human Interests), Alfred Adler (Problems of Neurosis), William Monter (Witchcraft in Geneva), Quentin Skinner, ed., (The Return of the Grand Theory in the Human Sciences), among many others.
The separation of science and philosophy is a relatively recent phenomenon. Historically, the term "philosophy" or "natural philosophy" named the enterprise that attempted to understand the nature of the world and our knowledge of it. In this course, we will explore the relation between science and philosophy, using evidence from the subject matter and practice of science to address enduring philosophical issues concerning knowledge and reality. The lectures and discussions will engage questions such as the following: What is a theory? Is physics the only genuine science?
Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper, and J.D. Trout (eds., 1991), The Philosophy of Science (The MIT Press/Bradford Books).
Peter Kosso (1993), Reading the Book of Nature (Cambridge University Press).
There will be additional readings placed on reserve or handed out in class.
A fundamental goal of psychology is to describe how humans reason. A fundamental goal of epistemology -- the theory of knowledge -- is to set out how humans ought to reason, and so to acquire knowledge. There is no responsible way of answering the second question without accurately answering the first. So, how do humans reason? Once we have a psychological description of how we reason, it is natural to ask a normative question: How well do we reason? If our reasoning is suboptimal, what can we do, if anything, to improve?
The readings, syllabus, topics for discussion and occasional announcements will be posted on blackboard, at http://www.blackboard.luc.edu.
This course presents a state-of-the-art discussion of research on judgment and decision-making. Decisions large and small are part of everyday life. What should I have for lunch? Should I go running? Should I pursue a relationship with this person? Will this job make me happy? Should I have this lump removed? Should I save more for a comfortable retirement? Usually, we don't make the best decisions, even when we have the best information. But the quality of our decision-strategies depends upon factors in economics, philosophy, and psychology.
Thomas Gilovich, How We Know It Isn't So. Free Press, 1991.
Other readings (on Blackboard)